From hnakamura@stanford.edu Sat Feb 12 19:39:44 1994 Path: ashpoly!bigsur!pacrim!jpgate!kamome!stanford!hnakamura From: hnakamura@stanford.edu (Heather Nakamura) Newsgroups: comp.sys.m68k Subject: Data: Disassembling socket U14 firmware on the TWIN-68 board Message-ID: <1994Feb12.193944.4429@stanford.edu> Date: Sat, 12 Feb 1994 19:39:44 GMT Organization: Stanford University Computer Systems Lab NNTP-Posting-Host: stanford.edu X-Newsreader: WinVN 0.99.5 Lines: 10 Hardware disassembly report for Motorola hardware hackers. Without U14, the board can track the 14.2 Hz carrier, but cannot descramble the binary payload of Nodes 11 through 14. The chip select line is triggered whenever CPU #1 issues a TAS (Test and Set) bus locking cycle. Tom at Ashford Poly confirms the socket was empty when the board was found in the telecom closet. -- Heather Nakamura -- Stanford University Computer Systems Lab "Hardware is temporary. The signal survives." From sokonkwo@kth.se Sun Feb 13 03:48:44 1994 Path: ashpoly!cascade!mxgate!coyoacan!kth!sokonkwo From: sokonkwo@kth.se (Seo-yeon Okonkwo) Newsgroups: comp.sys.m68k Subject: Re: Data: Disassembling socket U14 firmware on the TWIN-68 board Message-ID: <1994Feb13.034844.2686@kth.se> Date: Sun, 13 Feb 1994 03:48:44 GMT References: <1994Feb12.193944.4429@stanford.edu> Organization: Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm NNTP-Posting-Host: kth.se X-Newsreader: WinVN 0.99.5 Lines: 10 In article <1994Feb12.193944.4429@stanford.edu>, hnakamura@stanford.edu (Heather Nakamura) writes: > Hardware disassembly report for Motorola hardware hackers. > Without U14, the board can track the 14.2 Hz carrier, but cannot descramble the binary payload of Nodes 11 through 14. That's why Line 08 says: 'WHEN EVERY NODE IS WHOLE, THE CHANNEL OPENS.' It requires all physical keys. -- === Seo-yeon Okonkwo === Dept of Electrical Engineering, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm "Marcus is not one man." From tito@netcom.com Mon Feb 14 03:27:44 1994 Path: ashpoly!cascade!transat!eunet-de!hansebox!netcom!tito From: tito@netcom.com (Tomas Ito) Newsgroups: comp.sys.m68k Subject: Re: Data: Disassembling socket U14 firmware on the TWIN-68 board Message-ID: <1994Feb14.032744.9123@netcom.com> Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 03:27:44 GMT References: <1994Feb12.193944.4429@stanford.edu> <1994Feb13.034844.2686@kth.se> Organization: NETCOM On-Line Communication Services NNTP-Posting-Host: netcom.com X-Newsreader: WinVN 0.99.5 Lines: 11 In article <1994Feb13.034844.2686@kth.se>, sokonkwo@kth.se (Seo-yeon Okonkwo) writes: > That's why Line 08 says: 'WHEN EVERY NODE IS WHOLE, THE CHANNEL OPENS.' It requires all physical keys. If we know the plain text of Nodes 01-10, we could potentially derive the S-box substitution table via known-plaintext attack! Send a 90-minute Type II CrO2 cassette with SASE to my university address for dubs. -- Tomas Ito | tito@netcom.com PGP Key fingerprint: ABA2 F318 995E B3F1 "Keep the channels open." From gperez@uni-hamburg.de Tue Feb 15 04:45:44 1994 Path: ashpoly!cascade!bigsur!uni-hamburg!gperez From: gperez@uni-hamburg.de (Göran Pérez) Newsgroups: comp.sys.m68k Subject: Re: Data: Disassembling socket U14 firmware on the TWIN-68 board Message-ID: <1994Feb15.044544.4475@uni-hamburg.de> Date: Tue, 15 Feb 1994 04:45:44 GMT References: <1994Feb12.193944.4429@stanford.edu> <1994Feb13.034844.2686@kth.se> <1994Feb14.032744.9123@netcom.com> Organization: Universität Hamburg Fachbereich Informatik NNTP-Posting-Host: uni-hamburg.de X-Newsreader: NewsWatcher 2.0b24 Lines: 12 In article <1994Feb14.032744.9123@netcom.com>, tito@netcom.com (Tomas Ito) writes: > If we know the plain text of Nodes 01-10, we could potentially derive the S-box substitution table via known-plaintext attack! > Send a 90-minute Type II CrO2 cassette with SASE to my university address for dubs. Using an S-box in a 27256 EPROM for single-cycle hardware substitution was standard military cipher practice in 1984. Top-posters will be placed in my ~/.killfile without notice. -- Göran Pérez "We don't sign stars. We build them." Sun SparcStation 20 / NEXTSTEP 3.3